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Abstract 
Oskam, A.J. (1981). Policy models for the dairy sector of the European Com-
munity and the Netherlands. Agric. Res. Rep. (Versl. landbouwk. Onderz.) 
915. ISBN 90 220 0790 1, (viii) + 71 p., 11 tables, 20 figs, 4 refs, Eng. 
and Dutch summaries. 
This report is a sequal to an interim report on the dairy policy of the 
European Community (EC). It gives a description of many policy alternatives 
with instruments like price policy, income policy, premium systems, quota 
systems, co-responsibility levies and structural policy. Many aims of policy 
come up for discussion. Several other elements than objectives like producers' 
income, consumers' income and budget costs are relevant in the pro's and 
con's of any dairy policy. Here they are all incorporated in the analysis. 
The report surveys the measurement of the effects of alternative policies 
and gives extensive results for the EC and the Netherlands. It is necessary 
to start with the Community as a whole, which can be used as a basis for 
national models. The user of the computer models can vary in many assumptions, 
data and instruments. 
Since results are too bulky for simple interpretation, a method of conden-
sing the information is presented. The importance of different aims can be 
given by means of weightings. From these weights an objective function is 
calculated and gives a direct opportunity of fixing (personal based) priori-
ties for each alternative. 
Free descriptors: dairy sector, policy alternatives, multiple objectives, 
decision analysis, computer simulation. 
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Preface 
The European Community (EC) dairy policy is a matter of much debate and 
consideration. Therefore, it is certainly no uncalled for luxury to supply 
the involved parties with sufficient information. This report gives a brief 
outline of the principles and possibilities of the allied computer models 
for the dairy sectors of the European Community and the Netherlands. 
In this particular research model, a new approach has been chosen in re-
lation to the cooperation between research and preparatory policy. Not only 
is it now possible to make use of the model results, but it is also possible 
to supply one's own supplementary information. Moreover - within the limits 
of the model - one can formulate one's own policy alternatives and have them 
processed. Thus one achieves (practical) insight into not only the actual 
working model but also the importance of supplementary information as well 
as the consequences of change in the formulation of policy alternatives. 
In this way, I hope to contribute towards the knowledge and insight of 
those concerned with dairy policy. This report is meant for all who are in-
volved in formulation, preparation, implementation or assessment of dairy 
policy. 
This report forms part of a larger research project in which the dairy 
policy of the European Community, the Netherlands and (at a later stage) 
the United Kingdom will be examined. 
1 Introduction and outline of the situation 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In 1976, when the 'Study Group on Dairy Policy' consisting of a few mem-
bers of the Department of Agricultural Economics of the Agricultural Uni-
versity in Wageningen together with economists from The Royal Netherlands 
Dairy Federation FNZ and an official of the Ministry of Agriculture, started 
studying the actual dairy problems, they were most certainly not treading 
on unknown territory. From various sides, and in different countries, the 
pressure of the existing dairy problems had resulted in special studies on 
which a great deal of reports, studies, magazine articles and policy sugges-
tions were dedicated. 
In view of the problems in the EC dairy sector, there were grave shortcom-
ings in almost all of the research, and in consequence the results were not 
directly applicable. The following failures are pointed out: 
- Many of the studies were (and still are) directed towards the national 
agriculture or the national dairy sector, and not towards that of the EC. 
- Often only a limited number of policy objectives were taken into consider-
ation. For example, consideration was given only to budget or to national 
income, or attention was only given to the consequences for the producer or 
the consumer. 
- In the studies relating to policy, there was often only a comparison of 
the policy being followed at that time with one policy alternative which 
was recommended by one or more of the writers; sometimes a few alternatives 
were presented. 
- There was absolutely inadequate quantitative information in many of the 
studies; developments and consequences were merely pointed out. 
- A very important point, which only became apparent later, was the lack of 
information relating to comparison of the various policy objectives (and 
this refers not only to the dairy sector!). 
From the beginning, the 'Study Group' decided on a study at EC level and 
not a national level. In fact, dairy policy is carried out to a large extent 
at EC level. This means that not only the more traditional policy objectives 
are included in the research, but also many other policy aspects are given 
consideration (such as price stability, regional specialisation, well-balan-
ced international trade, environment, distribution of incomes, etc.). 
An interim report (Interim-rapport, 1978) gives a description and an an-
alysis of the EC dairy sector, and based on this, a number of policy alter-
natives (at European level) have been taken into account. This report led 
to a review of the policy alternatives and to the consequences thereof. 
After the composition of the Interim-rapport (1978) I worked on computer 
models for the EC dairy sector as well as for the Netherlands. These models 
should be applicable in practice in such a way that a great amount of ques-
tions relating to dairy policy (in the first place) can be answered. Of cour-
se it is important that persons or institutions involved in policy formula-
tion be aquainted with the basic principles of the models, as well as the 
possibilities available and interpretation of the results. 
This particular report, whilst not going into detail, indicates (as far 
as possible) which principles have been maintained, how the calculations 
are made and the accordances between models for the EC and the Netherlands. 
A description of policy objectives and policy alternatives is included as 
well as the (possible) results which can be achieved. 
Subsequently, it is a question of experimentation and interpretation in 
order to arrive oneself at a conclusion concerning the contents of the re-
sults and the usefulness thereof. 
1.2 THE DAIRY SITUATION WITHIN THE EC 
The situation in the EC dairy sector and the policy which is followed 
both at the EC and national level, can be defined as follows: 
Since the inception of a common dairy market, there has been no market 
equilibrium. By this, I mean that, under normal circumstances - weather, 
consumption, world market, etc. - the milk demand (against prices which the 
producers receive) is smaller than the amount available. This unbalanced 
situation existed in a few of the member countries before the EC came into 
being; nevertheless, the establishing of a rather high price only served to 
increase the imbalance. Over the years, a variety of measures have been de-
veloped which, to the expense (mainly) of the EC budget, have only served 
to obscure the situation. The changing circumstances, previously mentioned, 
and certain policy adaptations, are the cause of the sudden 'butter and skim-
med milk powder mountains' which occur, or disappear. In this respect, polit-
ical pressure on a systematic change in EC dairy policy is also of varying 
influence. 
The situation regarding the income of many of the dairy farms is unfavour-
able. This is partly due to a relatively unfortunate farming structure when 
compared with arable farms: smaller farms and lower quality land, etc. None-
theless, any adaptation in dairy policy, which will certainly be at the ex-
pense of the dairy farmers, means burdening the weakest shoulders and, thus, 
becomes almost a political impossibility. 
The decision-making procedure in the EC is extremely tiresome and compli-
cated. Consequently, any important policy changes - most especially in the 
principles -have hardly any chance of being introduced. It is far easier 
for a group of countries and/or pressure groups to reject a proposal which 
is disagreeable to them, than for a modification to be introduced which is 
in the interests of some countries and/or pressure groups. This has led to 
a situation which does not work anymore on the basis of rational policy; 
such policy is only marginally adapted when political questions arise (budget 
limits, 'mountains' of butter and skimmed milk powder, special sales to the 
Soviet Union, etc.). Moreover, the European Commission shows little insight 
in the anticipated effects of any change in policy. 
The lack of decisiveness in the political decision-making process is also 
due to lack of a policy alternative which, from almost all points of view, 
would be an improvement on present policy. 
- The EC dairy policy is one of the pillars of the EC agricultural policy. 
With a change of principles in dairy policy, the question also arises whether 
a policy change in cereals and beef is not also desirable1. 
An evaluation of the EC dairy policy (Interim-rapport, 1978) led to the 
conclusion that policy alternatives should preferably be sought for which 
in the long run, a market equilibrium exists with, if possible, slightly 
higher incomes for producers, a slightly lower price level for consumers 
and a relative reduction of budgetary costs. Each of these points received 
consideration when making the choice of policy alternatives; this was espe-
cially so for the reduction of budgetary costs. 
1. A quota system was chosen for sugar from the very beginning. However, 
the great problems incurred when adjusting the size of the quota to the de-
sired quantity (in accordance with the many policy options) illustrates that 
even a quota policy, where there is no adaptation agreement, is extremely 
difficult to handle within th EC. In addition, mention should be made of 
the fact that sugar-beet is only one of the various products on an arable 
farm, whereas milk is the main product on a dairy farm. Therefore, from the 
point of view of income, it would seem easier to adjust the quota for sugar-
beet. 
2 The method of examining EC dairy policy 
and the basic principles of research 
2.1 STUDYING THE EFFECTS OF EC DAIRY POLICY 
Since 1968, when the common dairy market came into existence, there has 
been frequent discussion about dairy policy. Suggestions by the European 
Commission during the past years as to change of policy :n the dairy sector 
have usually been prepared in a very brief manner. More than often, it is 
considered enough to roughly outline the developments over the last years, 
occasionally accompanied by a projection for the future. Besides this, often 
only an estimate is given of the budgetary aspects affecting the EC during 
the first year. An example of the way in which policy planning is presented 
can be seen in (Commission of the European Communities, 1976). This action 
programme was accompanied by a diagram (Figure 1) showing the anticipated 
production and consumption of milk for the period until 19852. 
However, in the action programme, no relationship whatsoever has been 
made between the proposed measures and the consequences due to the amount 
of production and consumption. These measures were: premiums for the non-mar-
keting of milk and for conversion to beef; a co-responsibility levy; suspen-
sion of national and community aid to the milk sector for three years; meas-
ures which benefit the market (e.g. school milk). The effects on income and 
budget have not been considered either. 
Lines (4) and (5) in Figure 1 indicate what was expected (based on the 
EC dairy model) of the proposed measures. It is clear that this quantitative 
information have placed the proposed measures in a very different perspective. 
Besides the European Commission which prepares the resolutions, the Council 
of Ministers has an important role in the final decision-making. Sometimes, 
the ministers of the individual member countries have good insight as to 
the effects such decisions will have on a national level; Western Germany 
is particularly advanced in this respect. 
Nevertheless, there is an absence of insight at EC level and this also 
undermines the information on a national level. Developments in other member 
countries, of course, continue in the respective country. 
The European Parliament is still quite inadequately equipped to provide 
2. As far as consumption is concerned, the diagram indicates the amount of 
milk necessary for the consumed quantity of milk fat. In this way, a system-
atic mistake is made in comparing production and consumption of milk. 
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Figure 1. Production and consumption of milk based on fat content within 
the European Community in 1960-1985. 1 = Including condensed milk and whole 
milk powder; 2 = Excluding condensed milk and whole milk powder; 3 = Produc-
tion; 4 and 5 = Consumption and production with introduction of the Action 
programme; 6 = Production trend (After: Commission of the European Communi-
ties, 1976). 
a good insight into the consequences of alternative forms of dairy policy 
for the EC. Taking this into consideration, it is my opinion that there is 
a definite need for a consistent, quantitative research on the EC dairy sec-
tor. 
2.2 BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE DAIRY SECTOR MODELS OF THE EC AND THE 
NETHERLANDS 
The basic points of research are briefly: 
The research and calculations start at EC level since a considerable amount 
of policy is effected at this level. When it is decided which policy effects 
are to be expected at EC level, then the dairy policy at national level can 
be worked out. In addition, the consequences of eventual supplementary meas-
ures of national governments can be analysed. 
An endeavour will be made to achieve research results, the possible effects 
of which can be reproduced for a large number of policy alternatives, over 
a long period. The period for consideration can be freely chosen (to a maximum 
of 20 years). 
In the calculations, as far as possible, use will be made of all available 
information. It is important that new data and research results can be incor-
porated into the models. In this way, insight is obtained in the 'value' of 
new information. 
The research must serve as preparation for practical, political decision-
making. The policy planners and politicians must have the possibility of 
experiencing how the model works. My thoughts go out to a sort of two-way 
traffic system. On the one hand, this experience will help support the form-
ing of ideas about policy alternatives; on the other hand, the model or the 
calculated alternatives can be readjusted according to certain experience, 
insight and direction in which alternatives are sought. 
It is already a fact that the person or persons doing the preparatory 
policy work will be confronted with an amount of information so vast that 
it will be almost impossible to oversee. For this reason, the available in-
formation must be reproduced in such a way that it is clear and convenient 
to all those concerned. When one presents practical indications concerning 
the importance of different policy aspects, then the policy aspects (effects) 
can be brought under one denominator. By this working-method, one gradually 
approaches policy alternatives which are of great interest. 
2.3 METHOD OF WORKING 
The method chosen is to use a computer model, into which policy measures 
and quantitative information can easily be introduced. The results of the 
calculations are then arranged in the most convenient way possible and can 
either be extremely detailed (e.g. for specific queries) or strongly aggre-
gated. 
3 The basic elements of the EC dairy model' 
Developments in the dairy sector and the effect of various forms of gov-
ernment policy are mainly analysed with the help of demand and supply curves. 
These curves are then again used for analysing the 'surplus situation' as 
well as the different policy effects. 
3.1 DEMAND AND SUPPLY CURVES 
The milk demand curve shows the amount of consumption at the different 
price levels (Figure 2). This curve is representative of the different sup-
ply curves of milk and dairy products. Nevertheless, there are different 
markets relating to the supply aspect: the internal EC market and the export 
market. And within the EC market, there is also a sort of division in the 
market where different prices apply on such secondary markets. There are 
also some secondary markets on the export side, as well as additional export 
in the form of food aid. Thus, in the model, more demand curves must be ta-
ken into account. 
The demand curve is indicative of the value of certain quantities of milk. 
For consumption within the EC, the marginal revenue value of milk is equal 
P(Price) 
Q, Q (Quantity) 
Figure 2. Demand curve (D) of milk. 
3. Those readers primarily interested in the model results (and less so in 
the basic principles) need only read Section 3.8, and then Chapter 4. 
to the price the consumer is prepared to pay. An extra milk unit to the quan-
tity Q (Figure 2), results in a revenue value P. per unit. 
This is less obvious in dairy products which are exported by the EC, since 
the marginal revenue can be less than that for the EC. In order to realise 
a marginal unit for export, a price decrease in the whole volume of export 
might be necessary; these price decreases are to the advantage of consumers 
outside the EC. Therefore, from the EC point of view, the demand curve and 
the marginal revenue value curve do not necessarily have to coincide. And 
this difference increases as the export becomes more important to the market. 
In due course, the demand curve shifts due to changes in population and 
actual income, as well as alterations in consumer preferences. Moreover, a 
change of policy can also effect the various demand components, as mentioned 
above, in different ways. 
The milk supply curve indicates the quantity of the milk supply at differ-
ent price levels (Figure 3). Under perfect market conditions4, the supply 
curve coincides with the marginal cost curve. This particular curve indicates 
which extra costs arise from an increase in production (or which costs dis-
appear due to a decrease in production). The progress of the marginal cost 
curve, and thus the supply curve as well, is on the short-term basis com-
pletely different from the long-term. This is because on a long-term basis, 
far more costs are variable and the producers (in the long run) are more 
adaptable to accepting price alterations. In other words: the price elasti-
city of supply is greater on a long-term basis than on a short-term basis. 
P (Price) 
C^QlQuantity) 
Figure 3. Supply curve (S) of milk. 
4. These are a) seeking maximum profits, b) good insight in the anticipated 
prices, c) producers who, individually, have hardly any influence on price 
forming. In practice, these conditions are usually complied with. 
S'short term' 
S'long term' 
Q2Qi Q3 
Figure 4. Consequences of a price-decrease on short-term and long-term basis. 
In due course, the supply curve shows a gradual shift due to technological 
and structural developments. Consequently, it becomes possible to offer more 
for the same price. The effect on the milk supply is of great importance. 
For example, it is quite possible that a considerable decrease in the milk 
price can - in the long run - still be accompanied by an increase of the 
milk production (see Figure 4, where the milk production goes to level Q_ on 
long-term basis). 
Now that the demand and supply curves have been introduced, a few concepts 
can be discussed which are related hereto. 
3.2 DEFINITION OF THE 'DAIRY SURPLUS' 
There are a great many definitions concerning the dairy surplus. One no-
tion is that the dairy surplus is identical to the stocks of butter and skim-
med milk powder which exist. Another idea is that the difference between 
export and import, together with nett stockpiling, is the surplus. Another 
definition of surplus is 'that part of the production which - for the price 
paid to the farmers - cannot be sold profitably on the market'. 
There is little point of going further into the first two definitions. 
The latter, however, can be easily seen in Figure 5. If P is the price paid 
to the farmers, then the so-called surplus is the same as the surplus in 
Figure 5. And the surplus cannot be sold for the price paid to the producers. 
Yet another definition of surplus is the difference between the actual 
quantity supplied (Qw) and the quantity where there is an equilibrium with 
demand (Qe). Consequently, this will be called overproduction. 
This clearly differs from surplus (Figure 5) and can still be worked out a 
little further. Relating to an equilibrium price level (P ), a price P leads 
to underconsumption (= Qe - Qv) and overproduction (= 0 - Q ). 
surplus 
overproduction 
underconsumption 
v ~e 'w 
Figure 5. Alternative definitions of surplus based on demand and supply 
curves (for symbols see text). 
A price level P is only possible when the market is regulated. When such 
an intervention, which results in a price level P for producer and consumer, 
is considered as the starting point (also in the future), then surplus be-
O are less than the revenue 
*e 
comes evident. The milk production costs of Q 
value of the milk yield. For this reason, there is no point in reducing the 
milk production further than Q ; then production factors would be removed 
from the dairy sector which present a higher revenue in this sector. In this 
definition of surplus (the overproduction), an optimal allocation of produc-
tion factors is most important. 
Up till now only theoretical curves have been used; the presentation of 
a few calculated demand and supply curves of milk for the EC will probably 
help to clarify the situation. The pertinent curves shown in Figures 6 and 
7 are for the years 1980 and 1990, respectively. 
We see that in 1980 the overproduction is relatively small. A small price 
elasticity of supply (on short-term basis) produces a production equilibrium 
which hardly differs from the anticipated production amount. Underconsumption 
appears to be much larger than overproduction on a short-term basis. In the 
long run, the adaptability on the supply side is far greater, and thus the 
overproduction in 1990 is much larger and amounts to about 20 % of the pro-
duction. Likewise, it is obvious, in order to obtain an equilibrium, that a 
lowering of the milk price on a short term basis is larger than on a long-
term basis. 
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Figure 6. Short-term demand and supply curves of milk in the EC for 1980 
(for symbols see t e x t ) . 
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Figure 7. Long-term demand and supply curves of milk in the EC for 1990 
(for symbols see t e x t ) . 
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3.3 POLICY ANALYSIS USING DEMAND AND SUPPLY CURVES 
The effects of almost all types of dairy policy can be determined by us-
ing the demand and supply curves. This is illustrated in Figures 8-10. 
Changes in the price of milk Price alterations can be analysed very well 
by using the demand and supply curves, which give the exact relationship 
between the price and the quantity of demand or supply. If D and S, respec-
tively, are the relevant demand and supply curves at a certain moment, then 
a price decrease from P, to P results in changes in consumption from Q? to 
d <= Q l 
Q2 and an alteration in the amount of supply from p? to Q° (Figure 8). 
It gets a little more difficult should the lower price level, in the long 
run, also affect the development of production techniques and the production 
structure in the dairy sector. If a substantial price decrease results in a 
decline in technical progress, not curve S, but curve S' is relevant. A low-
ering of price does not result in production Q?, but goes to level Q' 
(Figure 8). 
Quotas A milk production quota assures that a part of the supply curve be-
comes unimportant, and this is effective to the right of the quantity which 
is identical to the total quota, say Q2 (Figure 9). Nevertheless, also that 
part of the original supply curve, right of Q. can be used in order to deter-
mine the effects on income due to the quota. It is often stated that a quota 
influences technical development. This implies, on a somewhat longer term, 
a shifting of the supply curve (= marginal cost curve) from S to S': the 
costs per production unit increase. 
Figure 8. 
a? Q2d Q2Q|Qf Q 
Consequences of a change of price and a shift of the supply curve. 
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Figure 9. The effects of a quota on the milk supplied and the supply curve. 
Premiums Premiums for stopping or decreasing milk production depend on the 
voluntary participation of the dairy farmers. More than likely, the quan-
tity of milk which is removed from the market is that part with relatively 
high production costs. One can therefore estimate the size of the production 
decrease. For example, let us assume that an amount of Q_ is produced with 
the premium (Figure 10); when a premium becomes effective, it means a supply 
curve shift from S to S'. 
Q3Q1 Q2 
Figure 10. The effects of a premium (S') and a structural policy (S" ) on 
the supply curve and the milk supplied. 
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Prices of feed concentrates As the prices of concentrates increase, the 
production costs of milk do likewise; this means a shift of the marginal 
cost curve and consequently, a supply curve shift (e.g. from S to S' in 
Figure 10). the size of the shift is determined by the technical relation 
between milk and concentrates and the behaviour of dairy farmers with re-
spect to changes in the price of concentrates. 
Structural policy Structural measures are mainly expressed in subsidies 
for certain investments. This means that producers can increase their pro-
duction at the same costs (of course at a farmers point of view). The supply 
curve thus shifts to the right (from S to S" in Figure 10). The extent of 
the shift depends on the type of investment being subsidised. Here, we assume 
that the structural policy leads to the production level Q_. 
Co-responsibility levy At the supply side a co-responsibility levy is near-
ly the same as a price decrease (Figure 8). A co-responsibility levy is lev-
ied at farm gate price level. Adjusting the milk price by means of the inter-
vention prices for butter and skimmed milk powder works at dairy factory 
level. Unlike a price decrease, a co-responsibility levy does not effect 
the demand side. 
Super levy A super levy on quantities of milk per factory over and above 
a certain limit, can be interpreted in various ways. When the levy is suffi-
ciently high and the marginal price which the factories receive is so calcu-
lated that it also affects the dairy farmers, then such a super levy can 
almost be compared to a quota. However, if the levy affects the price of 
all the milk received, then such a super levy is comparable to a (region-
ally differentiated) co-responsibility levy. Of course, intermediate forms 
are also conceivable. 
Some other measures Measures such as: 
a special levy on all dairy products 
a price differentiation for milk and milk products, on the one hand, and 
the remaining dairy products, on the other (the former products become more 
expensive, the latter less expensive) 
a change in the level of the export restitution 
special consumption subsidies. 
These measures can all be quantified by the demand curves of milk (or 
with the demand curves relating to certain sections of the entire market). 
Conclusion From the above it follows that by using the demand and supply 
curves, the effects of policy alternatives - directly or indirectly - on 
production, consumption, surplus etc., can be determined. Further, Sections 
3.4 and 3.5 shall show that the other policy effects can be derived from 
this . 
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3.4 POLICY EFFECTS ON INCOME AND BUDGET 
The effects of policy changes are various; let us consider such effects 
on producers' and consumers' income, the budget and the EC income (which is 
the sum of the member countries' national incomes - also referred to as 'Com-
munity ' income). 
Although the calculation of these effects is not new by any means, in 
fact the results are hardly used. For this reason, the principles of a few 
policy changes will be shown and illustrated in figures. 
It is assumed that for unmodified policy, a price level P1 applies (at 
production level Q,), whilst P, is a price level nearer to the long-term 
equilibrium price (Figure 11). Therefore, a policy change from P1 to P2 will 
be considered. In addition, the effects of the quota, which reduces the pro-
duction from Q, to Q2 will be analysed. 
Producers' income Producers' income (see also Section 3.6), is the gross 
yield minus the variable production costs. Due to alterations in price, the 
gross yields change from OQ1CP1 to OQ-DP-, whilst the variable costs are 
reduced by the hatched area Q2Q1CD (Figure 11). Under perfect market condi-
tions the supply curve coincides with the marginal cost curve. The area be-
low the marginal cost curve shows the extent of the variable costs. Produ-
cers ' income is reduced with P.CDP,. 
A quota which causes a production decrease from Q, to Q, (whilst the milk 
price remains at level ¥•,), means that the gross yield is reduced by Q2Q1CM. 
At this point, it is difficult to estimate the cost decrease. Only when the 
same decrease of costs are effected as in a price decrease from P1 to P2, 
can the cost reduction be identical to the hatched area Q,Q1CD. However, a 
quota - depending on the conditions attached to it - usually results in a 
Figure 11. Effects of price decrease and quota on the producers income (for 
symbols see text). 
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lesser cost reduction, and the extent of this in the model depends on: 
the size of the quota in relation to the anticipated production without 
a quota 
distributing quotas for the different farms (e.g. relatively higher 
quotas for smaller farms) 
to which extent these quotas are transferable to other producers. 
Consumers' income Consumers' income means the real purchasing power of the 
consumers' disposable income. In a price reduction from P, to P_, the consu-
mers' 'income' (or consumer surplus) goes up, as seen in the hatched area 
P„KHP, (Figure 12). The consumers on the market at price level P., now need 
to pay less and thus have some extra income. This is less true when refer-
ring to new consumers (or to extra consumption per consumer). Nevertheless, 
even here, there are consumers prepared to pay more than the price P?. 
Applying a quota up to quantity Q„ has no effect on the consumers' income; 
the price P, is still paid for the consumption. 
Budget The budgetary costs of the EC dairy policy are influenced - either 
via a division in the market and/or price differentiation - by the market 
situation. This is shown in Figure 13 by the 'stepped' supply curve of milk 
which can be sold on certain secondary markets at continually lower prices 
(P,, P., etc.) because it cannot be sold at the producers price level P.. 
The budgetary costs were originally (at price P-. ) identical to the entire 
hatched area in Figure 13; at price level P_, the only costs which remain 
are those represented by the cross-hatched area. As soon as the normal mar-
ket absorbs more, the first thing which is stopped is sale at the price P,-. 
The effects of a quota is that the budget costs, which are reproduced in 
Figure 14 as the hatched area, recede to the cross-hatched area. 
Q ^ Q 
Figure 12. Effect of price decrease on consumers' income (for symbols see 
text). 
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Figure 13. Effect of price decrease 
on EC-budget (see text). 
Q2 o, Q 
Figure 14. Effect of a quota on 
the EC-budget (see text). 
EC income Likewise, in determining the effects on EC income, the presence 
of various sales markets must be taken into account. With a price decrease 
of milk from P., to P., production goes to level Q?. 
The following two features provide an increase in EC income: 
the difference between the marginal costs and the marginal revenue value 
is smaller at Q2 than at Q. 
due to the price decrease, more milk is used on the normal market. The 
milk which was being sold on the secondary markets for a lower marginal out-
put value, can now be used for a better purpose. 
The hatched area in Figure 15 shows the increase of EC income due to the 
afore-mentioned features. 
A quota up to level Q, means a change of EC income, which is somewhat 
Q 2 Q 1 Q 
Figure 15. Effect of price decrease and quota on EC income. 
17 
less than the hatched area to the right in Figure 15. The size of this de-
pends on the way in which the quota is applied. 
3.5 OTHER POLICY EFFECTS 
As well as effects on income and budget, the dairy policy also effects a 
few other policy aspects which are certainly of importance. Some are diffi-
cult to quantify, others a little easier. The method chosen in the model 
here is that which gives all the effects quantitatively, but where each in-
dependent policy aspect is handled in an independent manner (= dimension). 
We shall now consider the various policy aspects. Just as the effects on 
income and budget, the various policy effects will be determined in relation 
to 'unmodified policy'. 
Administrative feasibility When considering the administrative feasibility 
of a certain policy, two somewhat different points should be taken into ac-
count: 
the size and administrative costs of a certain policy 
whether a policy can be realised ('attainability') within the institution-
al framework. 
The first point can be quantified within certain limits. The extent of 
the administrative transactions on the various forms of policy must be stud-
ied, so that a reasonably effective policy performance can be expected. When 
a policy is followed in which each individual dairy farmer must be adminis-
tratively approached, this will obviously be accompanied by very heavy admin-
istrative costs. Administrative costs depend on: 
type of policy 
further implementation of certain types of policy. 
The second point ('attainability') is not included in this policy aspect. 
This is mainly dependent on the total evaluation of a policy measure (where 
the administrative feasibility is but a part). 
Income distribution for dairy farmers A certain average income for dairy 
farmers can still be distributed in various ways; this income distribution 
is more equal when: 
milk prices are lower 
quotas are smaller 
incomes and quotas are distributed more to the advantage of the 'smaller' 
dairy farmers 
prices of concentrates are higher 
less money is spent on structural policy. 
However, the effects of a policy measure on the income distribution can 
prove to be somewhat different on a long-term basis than on a short-term. 
Equilibrium of international trade The situation regarding international 
trade is better balanced when the EC exports less dairy products at (less) 
subsidised prices, the import of dairy products (at normal prices) is a pos-
itive contribution; a special import levy on concentrates (for dairy cattle) 
has a contrary effect. 
Regional specialisation Regional specialisation in the EC is stimulated 
by: 
more price equilibrium; owing to this, in the long run, milk is produced 
in the areas most suitable 
- premiums for cutting-down or stopping milk production. 
Placing quotas on the milk production works to the contrary, and this is 
accentuated when: 
quotas are not negotiable 
redistribution in favour of 'weaker' areas. 
Nature and environment With the closely linked objectives of nature and 
environment, a distinction is made between areas with intensive and exten-
sive land use. 
In areas with intensive dairy farming, the natural and environmental ef-
fects are linked with the amount of the milk production. This improves as 
milk production decreases, although this tendency is changing. 
It is quite possible that a quota system - as well as having a favourable 
effect owing to production decrease - can also be so arranged that large 
farms and areas with intensive land use are given a relatively small quota. 
This is advantageous to nature and environment, both in intensively and ex-
tensively used areas. 
Many of the measures which have positive effects on areas with intensive 
land use (compared with unmodified policy), have unfavourable effects on 
areas with extensive land use (and vice versa). 
Price stability As the difference between production and consumption in-
creases (under normal circumstances), a greater price stability can be ex-
pected with the present intervention system. However, when there is a very 
great difference, extra production hardly contributes to the price stability. 
Policy measures which, under normal circumstances, result in an equilib-
rium between demand and supply, will show great instability in price forming 
unless extra provisions are made. 
3.6 HOW THE DAIRY SECTOR IS INCLUDED IN THE MODEL 
The dairy sector is not only dairy farming. Certain branches of industry 
supply to the dairy farms (e.g. the mixed-feed industry) whilst the dairy 
industry processes the milk. Between the dairy industry and the consumer 
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(or export), there are also the industrial branches of trade and transport. 
These industrial branches (or sections thereof) involved in milk and dairy 
production are also referred to as the 'production chain' (Figure 16). 
The question now arises, to what extent the entire 'production chain' 
has been included in the model. 
When referring to producers' income, this means the gross yields of milk 
at factory level (and in the form of butter and skimmed milk powder) less 
the variable production costs of the dairy farmer and the dairy factory. 
This means in principle that attention is given to the income from the pro-
duction factors now to be found on the dairy farm and in a section of the 
dairy industry. Because, over a short period, some supplies to the dairy 
farms and the dairy industry have been earmarked as fixed costs, it appears 
(indirectly) that the remuneration of the production factors from the sup-
plying industries are also being taken into consideration. Over a longer 
period, there are many more variable costs; the consequences are: 
it is anticipated that the production factors (e.g. labour) on the dairy 
farm and dairy industry will be partly employed in another way. The incomes 
involved here have, in principle, been included in the producers' income 
it is assumed that the industrial supply branches will, in due course, 
be able to find other purposes for their production factors should there be 
a reduction in the demand of goods and services by the dairy farms and the 
dairy industry. 
From the above, it appears that the focus is on the production factors 
which are now in the dairy sector. It is not certain if these production 
factors can also be considered as being in the dairy sector in the future. 
export 
— 4 — 
consumption 
1 
•dairy industry 
dairy farm 
supply branches 
Figure 16. Production chain of the dairy sec tor . 
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Changes in EC income are usually decided along the same lines. Due to a 
lack of opportunity for the production factors, deviations are sometimes 
sought, for example, with premiums which are meant to temporarily reduce 
production capacity to non-active. 
3.7 THE DAIRY MODEL'S LIMITATIONS AND UNCERTAINTIES 
As in all economic models, this model also has its limitations and uncer-
tainties. One of the limitations particularly, is the fact that only the 
dairy sector has been included in the model; very little consideration has 
been given to the policy effects relating to other agricultural products 
(cereals, beef, etc.). Another limitation concerns the macro character of 
the model, which means that only information is available for the entire EC 
(or the Netherlands). To what extent certain groups of dairy farmers or con-
sumers, for example, may be affected by changes in policy cannot be (directly) 
ascertained. Should more detailed information be required, further research 
will be necessary. 
It is always difficult to predict future developments, and this also ap-
plies to the dairy sector. However, during the past years, many developments 
in this sector have taken place, and this creates a certain confidence in 
the predictability of future developments, especially in regard to the total 
internal consumption of milk and dairy products. 
A great amount of parameters (coefficients) and relationships which bear 
very uncertain characters have been included in the model. 
The method used was to include as much available information in the model 
as possible. Nevertheless, persons or institutions may have different ideas 
about the value of the coefficients in the model, thus the model has been 
set up in such a way that other information can be introduced, coming from 
different places. In this way, one can ascertain whether the calculated pol-
icy effects differ when other information, assumptions or policy instruments 
are used. 
3.8 SUMMARY 
Use is made of milk demand and supply curves in the EC dairy model. For 
each policy alternative, the demand and supply developments are determined. 
From this, it is possible to deduce how large the so-called 'surplus' will 
be. This 'surplus' is sub-divided into overproduction and underconsumption. 
On the basis of demand and supply curves, the effects are determined of 
policy changes (regarding unmodified policy) on producers' income, consumers' 
income, the EC income and the EC budget. The existence of secondary markets 
for the sale of milk and dairy products has also been taken into considera-
tion. The effects are also defined relating to: 
administrative feasibility 
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income distribution among dairy farmers 
international trade 
regional specialisation 
nature and environment at intensive and extensive land use 
price stability. 
Some of these effects are difficult to express in figures. 
The EC dairy model is mainly limited to the dairy farmers and the dairy 
industry, up to the processing level of butter and skimmed milk powder. Al-
though the model has its limitations, this is somewhat obviated by the pos-
sibility of introducing other information. 
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4 Working with the EC computer model and 
the obtainable results 
The information used in the computer model can be divided into the follow-
ing types: 
1. data concerning the dairy sector; 
2. the coefficients of the model; 
3. the expected future developments by unmodified policy; 
4. further formulation of different policy alternatives. 
Categories 1, 2 and 3 (Block I in Figure 17) fit into the type of infor-
mation which, in practice, is usually supplied by the 'researcher'. In Sec-
tion 3.7 it was noted that a part of this information has an uncertain char-
acter. For this reason, a working method has been chosen which permits easy 
alteration to a part of the information. 
Category 4 (Block II in Figure 17) usually falls under 'policy'. For ex-
ample, one may be interested in the effects of certain policy alternatives 
and require insight into a few variants, viz. slight variations of approx-
imately the same type of policy. Likewise here, alterations can easily be 
made in the information supplied via Block II. 
Furthermore, with the help of the computer model, a great amount of poli-
cy effects have been calculated (Block III of Figure 17). 
The policy alternative 'unmodified policy' has an important role in the 
calculation. This alternative is described as the type of market and price 
policy which was in force for the EC during the period 1968-1976. This a-
mounted to a real decrease in the milk price of 0,5 % per year. During the 
period 1977-1979, the real price decrease was larger; the effect hereof -has 
also been included in unmodified policy. 
When determining certain policy effects, other policy alternatives are 
compared with unmodified policy. 
Policy instruments 
Information 
(data; research 
results,etc.) 
Calculated 
relating to: 
-production 
- consumption 
-income 
-budget 
-administration 
etc. 
Figure 17. The basic outline of working with the EC dairy model. 
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4.1 PRESENTATION OF A FEW RESULTS 
In order to familiarise the reader with some of the calculated results, 
a summed aspect matrix has been included (Table 4), which will clearly show 
the effects of various policy alternatives. This summed aspect matrix is 
introduced step by step. 
Overproduction, underconsumption and surplus Overproduction and undercon-
sumption, resulting from each of the policy alternatives under consideration, 
have been determined and are summed up (for example, over the 15 year period 
1980-1994) as shown in Table 1. Special attention is given to four policy 
alternatives (see Section 4.2 for a more extensive description): 
unmodified policy 
a real annual decrease in the milk price, which is 1 % more than that of 
unmodified policy 
a quota on milk production at the 1980 level 
a super levy on milk over and above 99 % of the 1980 production level, 
together with a voluntary decrease of production and a 3 % co-responsibility 
levy. 
Table 1 shows that unmodified policy results in a surplus of 293 + 113 
million tons of milk. The surplus is less when considering the other types 
of policy. The last column of Table 1 is not an essential part of the table, 
but is included as an illustration. The results in the aspect matrix refer-
ring to overproduction and underconsumption (Tables 1 and 4) do not relate 
to unmodified policy; both quantities originate from a comparison with equi-
librium prices. 
Table 1. Effects of four policy alternatives on overproduction, undercon-
sumption and surplus (1980-1994). 
Policy alternative 
1 Unmodified policy 
6 Annual price 
decrease 
22 Quota system 
26 Super levy, volun-
tary decrease of pro-
duction and a co-res-
ponsibility levy 
Overproduction 
(mil.tons of milk) 
293 
205 
85 
19 
Underconsumption Surplus (in % of 
(mil.tons of milk) the production) 
113 
70 
113 
99 
24 
17 
13 
24 
Table 2. Income and budget effects of four policy alternatives, during the 
period 1980-1994. 
Policy alternative 
1 Unmodified policy 
6 Annual price decrease 
22 Quota system 
26 Super levy etc. 
Summed effects, relative to unmodified policy 
(in milliard guilders of 1976) 
producers 
income 
0 
-49 
0 
-21 
consumers 
income 
0 
35 
0 
14 
budget 
0 
-44 
-51 
-77 
EC income 
0 
29 
51 
60 
Effects on income and budget The way in which income and budget effects 
are determined can be seen in Chapter 3. Here, policy aspects are compared 
with unmodified policy. The yearly effects are summed up with a 3 % rate of 
discount. This means that future amounts are of somewhat less importance. 
Since all the amounts are determined in real prices, it would appear that a 
3 % discount rate is a reasonable choice; however, variations are possible. 
Owing to the comparison which takes place with unmodified policy, the 
first row of Table 2 consists of zeros. The total (discounted) budgetary 
costs for this period, amount to 133 milliard guilders. Policy Alternatives 
22 and 26 show the greatest effect on budget and EC income, whilst a price 
decrease is to the consumers' advantage; however, to the disadvantage of 
the producers (Table 2). 
The remaining policy effects The remaining policy effects are also related 
to unmodified policy. The scale used shows the greatest difference relating 
to unmodified policy at +5 or -5 (depending on the direction in which this 
difference progresses). The numbers -5 or +5 do not occur in Table 3 because 
only a few rows of the aspect matrix (Table 4) have been included. 
According to the administrative feasibility, there is no difference be-
tween Policy Alternative 1 and 6, whilst Policy Alternative 22 and 26 appear 
to be more difficult. Other effects can also be easily seen in Table 3. 
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4.2 A DESCRIPTION OF THE DIFFERENT POLICY ALTERNATIVES 
Twenty six different policy alternatives have been integrated into the 
EC dairy sector model; moreover, by adapting the instrument values, these 
policy alternatives can also be varied to a great extent. Within the limits 
of the model, the results can be determined of many types of policy. The 
following sections present a short definition of each policy alternative, 
with its matching number. Many of the amounts mentioned are variable. 
1. Unmodified policy A price policy in conformity with the period 1968-1976, 
when the real milk price declined yearly with 0.5 %. This price development, 
together with a supply increase of 1.8 % per year, are extrapolated for the 
period 1980-1994. 
2. Once-only price decrease, leading to long-term equilibrium A real price 
decrease of about 17 % for producers and consumers. Later, a price development 
comparable to unmodified policy. 
3. Once-only price decrease and stock policy A real price decrease of 
about 17 % for producers and consumers (see Policy Alternative 2). A price 
stabilising stock policy is used. 
4. One-only price decrease and direct income allowances With a real price 
decrease of about 17 % (see Policy Alternative 2), producers are compensated 
for loss of income. This compensation is non-expirable. 
5. Once-only price decrease, direct income allowances and stock policy 
The policy formulated is as Policy Alternative 4, but with the addition of 
a price stabilising stock policy. 
6. Gradual annual price decrease An annual real decrease of 1 % in the 
price of milk for producers and consumers, comparable to unmodified policy. 
7. Gradual annual price decrease and direct income allowances An annual 
real decrease of 1.5 % (see Policy Alternative 6) together with compensation 
for producers' decrease of income. This compensation is non-expirable. 
8. Milk production quota near market equilibrium A quota system, in which 
the producers are confronted with higher prices for the necessary decrease 
in production. The quotas - for the first five years - amount to 90 % of 
the expected production level of 1980, and thereafter rise annually 0.5 %. 
9. Milk production quota near market equilibrium and stock policy Quotas 
as in Policy Alternative 8, with the addition of stock policy. 
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10. Special price policy and levy on concentrates A levy on concentrates 
for dairy cows, amounting to 3 0 %. Furthermore, a once-only decrease of 
0.5 % in the milk price; then, price development comparable to unmodified 
policy. A co-responsibility levy of 2 %. 
11. Premiums for stopping milk production Premiums for farms which com-
pletely stop milk production. This premium amounts to 80 % of the value of 
the milk production which is held back. It is obligatory to suspend the pro-
duction for four years, which means that - on a yearly basis - the premium 
amounts to 20 % of the value of the non-produced milk. 
12. Price differentiation between consumption milk and dairy products 
The price of milk and milk products increases 20 %; the price of other dairy 
products is decreased in such a way that total sales remain the same. 
13. Premiums and price differentiation A combination of Policy Alterna-
tives 11 and 12. 
14. Structural policy with unmodified prices The structural policy resour-
ces of the EC and the national governments average an increase of 23 % com-
pared with the present level. 
15. Structural policy with market equilibrium prices The structural policy 
resources increase with an amount which is the same as 1 % of the total milk 
production value (at equilibrium price level). 
16. Monopoly quota system A milk production quota, which means that after 
five years, the market is completely cleared, and at a price level which 
completely compensates producers for loss of income due to the production 
decrease. A stock policy is introduced for price stabilisation. 
17. Social quota system A milk production quota, arranged in such a way 
that the dairy farmers receive an income increase of about 12 %. The budget-
ary costs of the dairy policy amount to 60 % of the level of unmodified pol-
icy. Consumers pay the higher milk prices. A stock policy is used for price 
stabilisation. 
18. Social income allowance system A price decrease, but with income al-
lowances (see Policy Alternative 5) which are so high that the producers' 
income increases about 12 %. 
19. Cautious price policy for one year A price decrease of 2.5 % compar-
able to unmodified policy in the first year. There is a co-responsibility 
levy of 3 % during the whole period. 
20. Restrictive price policy for several years A price decrease of 2.5 % 
comparable to unmodified policy during the first five years. Furthermore, a 
co-responsibility levy of 3 %. 
21. Cautious price policy with increasing co-responsibility levy During 
the first year, a milk price decrease of 2.5 % comparable to unmodified pol-
icy. A co-responsibility levy commencing at 2 %, whilst the levy, per percen-
tage of production increase, goes up 2 % (i.e. a 2 % production increase 
means a levy of 6 % ) . 
22. Production quota on current production Quotas which equal the expec-
ted production level of 1980. The producers' loss of income due to limits 
on production, is compensated by a higher price level. 
23. Partial quota system During a period of six years, a production quota 
applies to 95 % of the expected production of 1980. Then there is a change 
of policy to long-term equilibrium prices for producers and consumers. The 
producers are compensated from the budget for loss of income. A stock policy 
is used. 
24. Double price-change system An initial milk price decrease of 10 %, 
followed (after five years) by a price decrease of about 12 %, which leads 
to equilibrium on a long-term basis. A real price decrease of 0.5 % in other 
years. The producers are compensated for the changes in price; stock policy 
is also used. 
25. Voluntary production reduction and cautious price policy A premium 
for voluntary decrease of production (= VR regulation), which means a pre-
mium of 30 % of the production value of the non-delivered milk. Furthermore, 
a once-only price decrease of 2.5 % comparable to modified policy, and a 
co-responsibility levy of 2 %. 
26. Super levy, VR regulation and cautious price policy A super levy on 
the delivery of milk above 99 % of the expected production level of 1980. 
The super levy is passed on to the dairy farmers. Furthermore, a voluntary 
production reduction with a premium of 30 % (see Policy Alternative 25), a 
once-only milk price decrease of 2.5 % (comparable to unmodified policy) 
and a co-responsibility levy of 2 %. 
Additional information for more than one policy alternative The basic prin-
ciples of the individual policy alternatives have been described; now the 
basic principles for more policy alternatives. 
For many of the types of policy, suppositions must be made concerning: 
the milk-fat price ratio in the milk price (fixed at about 56 %) 
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the relative price level of skimmed milk powder for calves (fixed at 58 % 
of the intervention price for skimmed milk powder) 
the export restitutions on dairy products (fixed at 45 % of EC price) 
the amount available, as well as price level, of cold-stored butter, and 
butter sold under special arrangements. 
Also relevant: 
producers' loss of income resulting from production quotas, which loss 
is compensated by the budget (Policy Alternatives 8, 9, 22 and 23) 
producers' loss of income due to price decrease, which is mainly compen-
sated by a levy on milk and dairy products (Policy Alternatives 4, 5, 7 and 
18) 
direct income allowances on the basis of 'historic' milk deliveries (Pol-
icy Alternatives 4, 5, 7, 18, 23 and 24) 
no social redistribution of income allowances and production quotas (Pol-
icy Alternatives 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23 and 24) 
production quotas are salable (Policy Alternatives 8, 9, 16, 17, 22 and 
23). 
Aspect matrix A complete aspect matrix (Table 4) for the EC is shown on 
page 31. The 26 policy alternatives are shown under the above mentioned 
assumptions. 
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5 The dairy model of the Netherlands 
The model for the Dutch dairy sector is coupled with that of the EC model. 
First of all, the consequences of diverse policy types are determined for 
the EC as a whole. In this way, information relating to prices, production, 
consumption, export, budgetary costs etc. is available for each policy type. 
It is then possible to decide what effects the respective policy alterna-
tives will have on each of the policy aspects (income, budget etc.) in the 
Netherlands. 
The effects of a certain EC policy for the Netherlands, are also influ-
enced by special conditions on a national level. For example, this refers 
to: 
the share of the EC budget (or parts thereof) contributed by the Nether-
lands 
the share of the Dutch dairy sector in production quotas, subsidised in-
vestments etc. 
to which extent certain types of policy are nationally financed. 
The computer model includes a great diversity of basic principles which 
can be taken into consideration. 
5.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE DUTCH DAIRY POLICY 
A number of dairy policy aims are directly tied-up with the EC as a whole: 
equilibrium of international trade, regional specialisation and price stab-
ility. Therefore, it is only sensible that these targets be considered from 
an EC point of view. One can also look at it thus: in the Netherlands and 
the EC5 there is no difference between policy effects. In some way, this 
also applies to the target variable 'nature and environment' in areas with 
extensive land use. Since such areas do not exist in the Netherlands, there 
is no effective difference between the Netherlands and the EC. 
However, the other aims (budget, national income, producers' income and 
consumers' income, administrative feasibility, income distribution and nature 
and environment with intensive land use) must be considered separately in 
order to determine the effects in the Netherlands. 
5. This does not mean to say - either from the Dutch point of view or from 
the EC point of view -that the same importance is attached to these policy 
aims. See further Chapter 6. 
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Employment In addition to the EC objectives, in the Netherlands attention 
will also be given to the effects of employment in the dairy sector. This 
involves the employment capacity on the dairy farms, the dairy industry and 
the supplying industry. 
It is not easy to determine these effects, and it has been decided at 
this stage of research not to attempt a calculation for the entire EC. Never-
theless, for various reasons, the results referring to the Netherlands must 
be maintained, though be it with a certain amount of caution: 
the calculation is based on very tentative figures 
it only concerns employment within the dairy sector. 
Whether policy changes in the dairy sector lead to more employment out-
side this sector, has not been included. A change in the labour force of 
the dairy sector can occur: 
in dairy farming - less farms producing milk or a reduction in the re-
quired labour per farm 
by a dairy production shift in the dairy industry 
a change in the supplies to the dairy farm (e.g. concentrates or in the 
service sector) or the dairy industry. 
With respect to employment, an effort has been made to determine the total 
effects concerning the entire dairy production chain. These effects will be 
further expressed in units of 1000 labour years. 
Overproduction, underconsumption and surplus EC equilibrium prices are used 
as a basis in determining overproduction, underconsumption and surplus. Over-
production can then be described as the difference in amount between the 
production, using a certain type of policy, and the equilibrium price policy. 
Underconsumption - and therefore the surplus - is calculated using the same 
principles. The thus calculated surplus is much smaller for the Netherlands 
than the difference between the quantities of milk supply and demand (see 
also Figures 18 and 19, where demand and supply curves are shown for the Neth-
erlands in 1980 and 1990). This is due to the fact that the EC equilibrium 
price is higher than the equilibrium price relating only to the Netherlands. 
The demand curve D in Figures 18 and 19, is the sum of the internal de-
mand (in the Netherlands) and the export to countries outside the EC. Export 
to other EC countries is not included. Moreover, both figures indicate which 
part of the export demand goes to non-EC countries. 
It. should be kept in mind that underconsumption, as shown in Figures 18 
and 19, is in fact much less, and that this is due to the export restitutions 
which have stepped-up the demand for dairy products from non-EC countries. 
Effects on administrative feasibility, income distribution and nature and 
environment The consequences of these policy aspects differ (relatively) 
very little from the entire EC results. However, a few differences can be 
noted. 
33 
P(gui lders / ton) 
600 
bUU 
4 0 0 
PP 
3 0 0 
2 0 0 
100 
\ D^V 
\ \ 
\ ! \ 
\ | 
\ r 
i i i i i 
s 
, / 
~ o 
^ \ iy, 
surplus 
i i 11 i 
°v Q d ° S Q w Q (mil l ion tons) 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 
Figure 18. Short-term demand and supply curves for milk; Netherlands 1980. 
D' = in t e rna l demand for the Netherlands. D = in t e rna l demand plus export 
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Figure 19. Long-term demand and supply curves for milk; Netherlands 1990. 
D' = internal demand for the Netherlands. D = internal demand plus export 
outside the EC. 
In the Netherlands, the administrative feasibility of many of the mea-
sures is relatively easy since the dairy farms, as well as the milk supplies 
to the factories, are well administered. Moreover, there are not many dairy 
factories (or concerns). However, an increase in the price of concentrates 
for dairy cows is not so easy to administrate in the Netherlands. 
There are greater differences between dairy farms within the EC than with-
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in the Netherlands. For this reason, the effects of policy measures on the 
dairy farmers' income distribution are more modest. 
As far as nature and environment are concerned, en eventual change from 
dairy farming to, for example, pig farming should be possible in the Nether-
lands. And yet, precisely in the Netherlands, the consequences for landscape 
and environment are less fortunate. 
5.2 RESULTS AFFECTING THE NETHERLANDS 
It seems advisable, in the first place, to keep the presentation of re-
sults somewhat limited, so that these are clear and well arranged. That is 
why - besides the unmodified policy - attention will only be give to Policy 
Alternatives 5 (once-only price decrease, direct income allowances and stock 
policy), 22 (production quota on current production) and 26 (super levy, VR 
regulation and cautious price policy). 
The calculations relating to the Dutch dairy model are still often based 
on very tentative numerical data; the results may differ greatly in a more 
definite version of this model. 
The effects on income, budget, employment and surplus for the EC and the 
Netherlands, are shown in Table 5. 
The results that relate to the Netherlands are based on assumptions re-
garding the distribution of costs. The budgetary shares which are assumed 
for the various precepts, as well as the Dutch dairy farming share in the 
total milk supply, can be seen in Column I of Table 6. Here, the actual ra-
tios for 1978 have been included. 
One may wonder if it is realistic to place budgetary shares and quotas 
on an equal level with the prevailing conditions. There are a few arguments 
against, which are: 
- The United Kingdom's partial compensation of budgetary costs which this 
country contributes to the EC in accordance with former agreements. The U-
nited Kingdom receives this compensation from the other members because it 
is considered that this country receives less from the resources in Brussels 
than it contributes. 
The extremely large contribution from Western Germany, which is only ac-
ceptable to that country because - in the industrial area - there are cer-
tain advantages within the EC. It is extremely doubtful whether any increase 
or decrease in the necessary resources will undergo the same repartition. 
It is assumed that the Netherlands will have a great advantage in the 
dairy sector, and for this reason - when negotiations are taking place re-
garding the projected EC policy - it is awkward for this country to insist 
on curtailing expenses in other agricultural sectors. 
We shall illustrate the importance of these points by calculating the 
Dutch dairy sector model with the hypotheses from Column II of Table 6. A 
comparison with Tables 5 and 7, shows great differences. In determining the 
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Table 6. Dutch shares for budgetary costs and quantities of milk supply 
in the EC. 
Type 
Budget shares 
Market and price policy 
Direct income transfers 
and tax on milk 
Compensation of producers 
for a quota system 
Premium for a voluntary 
reduction of production 
% shares of the 
Netherlands in the 
EC 
6.4 
6.4 
6.4 
6.4 
II 
% shares of the 
Netherlands in the 
EC 
10 
10 
10 
10 
Quantity shares 
Quotas 
Share for not paying a 
super levy 
12.1 
12.1 
11 
12 
Netherlands share in 
Import duties, import 
levies and Tax Value 
Added (total) 
Tax Value Added 
for the EC 
Quantity of milk 
delivered 
6.4C 
12.1 
10 
a. After: Wallace, 1980. p.61 
b. After: Commissie van de Europese Gemeenschappen, 1979. p.387. 
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Table 7. Effects on income, budget, employment and surplus for four 
policy alternatives over the period 1980-1994. 
Policy Summed effects, relative to 
alterna- unmodified policy 
tive (in milliard guilders of 
1976) 
produ- consu- budget national 
cers mers income 
income income 
Employment 
(in 1000 la-
bour years) 
Overpro-
duction 
(million 
tons of 
milk) 
Undercon' 
sumption 
(million 
tons of 
milk) 
1 Unmodified 
policy 
5 Once only 
price decrea-
se and income 
allowances 
22 Quota 
system 
26 Super 
levy, etc. 
-1.1 
-2.9 
0.2 
0.9 
0 0 
-6.0 5. 
-5.2 3.( 
-7.6 4.7 
-51 
-58 
-53 
37 
-1 
21 
21 
21 
19 
a. Based on the assumptions of Column II, Table 6. 
Table 8. Effects for some other policy aspects; a comparison between the 
EC and the Netherlands. 
Policy alternative 
European Community 
5 Once only price de-
crease and income al-
lowances 
22 Quota system 
26 Super levy, etc. 
Administrative 
feasibility 
-3.5 
-2.8 
-4.4 
Income 
distribution in 
dairy 
1.4 
0.6 
4.6 
Environment with 
intensive land use 
3.3 
1.9 
3.3 
The Netherlands 
5 Once only price de-
crease and income al- -3.5 
lowances 
22 Quota system -2.7 
26 Super levy, etc. -3.4 
1.4 
0.6 
4.5 
1.8 
3.2 
a. Based on the assumptions of Column I, Table 
consequences of certain types of policy on national level, the crucial point 
is to be found in the distribution hypotheses. 
Other polier/ effects As mentioned in Section 5.1, there are relatively no 
great differences between the remaining policy effects relating to the Nether-
lands and the EC. For the aspects relating to the equilibrium of interna-
tional trade, regional specialisation, nature and environment (with intensive 
land use) and price stability, these can be attributed to the manner of work-
ing. As can be seen from Table 8, the effects of Policy Alternatives 5, 22 
and 26 are almost identical. 
Aspect matrix Table 9 shows a complete survey of consequences for the 26 
different forms of dairy policy (for the period 1980-1994). The assumed 
shares in budgetary costs and quotas can be found in Column I of Table 6. 
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6 An attempt at making policy alternatives 
mutually comparable 
Both dairy models produce a great amount of results which are difficult 
to cope with. Each policy alternative has (relatively) favourable and unfa-
vourable consequences. Besides this, there is the sensitivity of the results 
to changes : 
in the coefficients of the model 
in the information introduced 
of policy instruments. 
This is only visible to an extremely practised eye. 
As soon as we are in a position to mutually compare the different policy 
aspects, then it is much easier to interpret the results of the calculations. 
In consequence, information must be available showing which interests are 
attached to each of the aims (or aspects). This is typically the political 
aspect of policy choice. As yet, this has only been used on behalf of persons 
and/or groups in order to bring the different policy aims under one denomi-
nator. And in this way, a clearer picture is obtained. 
This complete process of making policy alternatives mutually comparable 
can be likened to house evaluation. We shall refer to this example more than 
once. 
In determining the value of a house, different aspects are of importan-
ce, for example: 
size of the house 
layout of the house 
size and layout of the garden (if present) 
state of repair 
area in which the house is situated 
public ammenities in the vicinity. 
An appraiser will consider all these aspects in making his estimate 
of the market value. However, people who want to buy a house take into 
consideration individual preferences, which form the basis upon which 
one type of house is considered acceptable (together with the price which 
must be paid) whilst another is not. Because houses are often sold - and 
that this involves individual preferences - the practice is completely 
acceptable and clear to everyone. In new building areas, individual pref-
erences do not have quite the same importance. Here, an idea must be for-
med of the necessary requirements (and naturally the price) of the houses. 
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In order to make the policy measures mutually comparable, three steps 
must be considered: 
the composition of a score table, derived from the aspect matrix 
the introduction of a quantitative comparison of the various policy ob-
jectives 
determining the priorities which result from the comparison. 
6.1 SCORE TABLE 
The score table is derived from the aspect matrix by the use of a simple 
conversion procedure. Distinctions have been made between effects on income 
and budget and effects on the remaining policy aspects. 
In the aspect matrixes (Tables 4 and 9) the calculated effects relating 
to the remaining policy aspects can be seen on a scale of -5 to (eventually) 
+5, or from +5 to (eventually) -5. Unmodified policy always shows the value 0. 
In the score table, unmodified policy shows the value of 4. For each objective, 
the most unfavourable policy alternative shows the score 1, or the most fa-
vourable policy alternative, the score 7. 
Using these scores has resulted in the fact that the final score of an 
alternative can be influenced by the description of another policy alterna-
tive. This happens when the 'limit' alternative (being the score of 1 or 7) 
is otherwise defined. For this reason, the multiplication factors of the 
remaining policy effects are also provided in the score table. 
The scores relating to income and budget are obtained by first changing 
the signs of the budget column (a negative effect on budgetary costs is con-
sidered to be positive). Thereafter, the smallest amount is set at 1 
(= this is the change of producers' income in Policy alternative 15) whilst 
the largest amount is set at 7 (= the budgetary effect of Policy alternative 
16). All the amounts in-between are divided proportionally over the 1-7 area. 
The score of unmodified policy arrives at 3.99. 
Table 10 shows the aspect matrix and the derived score table of policy 
alternatives which were presented in Chapter 4. 
The employment score in the dairy sector is decided (for te Dutch dairy 
model) in the same way as the scores for the remaining policy aspects. 
The score table and the aspect matrix give exactly the same information; 
only a transformation of the amounts has taken place. In this way, it seems 
as if the effects on income and budget (and possibly employment) are easier 
to compare with the consequences of the remaining policy aspects. 
Returning to the terminology of the evaluation of a house: the volume 
of a house is given in cubic metres (and not in litres), the floor surface 
in square metres and not in ares. Nearby facilities are compared with an are 
in a reasonably large town and not anymore with a village. And yet all these 
facts have no effect on the final appraisal. 
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6.2 COMPARING POLICY OBJECTIVES 
The mutual comparison of the policy objectives can be considered as a 
process in finding a political choice out of the various policy alternatives. 
The responsibility for this rests on the shoulders of those who are respon-
sible for policy. Nevertheless, research into this process can be a contribu-
tion by finding out which priorities result from certain mutual comparisons 
of objectives (Figure 20). 
Thus, it is possible: 
to ascertain which policy instruments require further research (this is 
shown by the 'broken line' feedback arrows in the upper part of Figure 20) 
to decide which research information is necessary for a responsible choice 
of policy alternatives (shown by the feedback arrows in the lower part of 
Figure 20) 
to indicate the priorities which can be expected if - on the political 
side - the assumed comparison is maintained (shown by the arrow pointing 
towards the priorities in Figure 20). 
The comparison of policy alternatives will be done with the help of a 
system of weighting, in which the effects of a certain policy and the 'weights' 
representing each objective, are included. 
We have chosen the following weighting function: 
priorities = wA(xA)xA + wB(xB)xß + + wR(xK)xK 
in which 
w = weight 
x = effect on a policy objective 
A to K = policy objectives6. 
Such a weighting system means that: 
- the weight that one attaches to an objective can depend on the measure 
in which this objective is realised 
- the weight attached to one objective is irrespective of the realisation 
of another objective. 
If we apply the same principles to the evaluation of a house, this 
means : 
the value which one attaches to an extra cubic metre in the volume of 
a house or an extra square metre of garden, depends on the size of the 
house and garden 
6. Employment in the dairy sector is included in the Dutch dairy model as 
an extra objective. 
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Figure 20. Diagram for developing and assessing policy alternatives. 
the value which one attaches to an extra cubic metre of (house) volume 
is irrespective of the size of the garden. 
The latter would seem to be somewhat problematical in the appraisal 
of a house. A house, however, should be of harmonious proportions, and 
such harmony can apply, for example, to a house of limited proportions, 
compensated by a large private garden. 
Determining the weights In fact, this system of weighting can be seen as 
comparing a guilder in the hands of producers and with a guilder in the hands 
of consumers. If the producers' guilder is given a weight which is 33 % more 
than the weight of the consumers' income, then the weight for the producers' 
income is 2 when the weight of the consumers' income is 1.5. In this example, 
the two objectives are easily comparable. 
Weighting producers' income against administrative feasibility can be 
achieved as follows: one finds out what the administrative feasibility score 
is for one or more policy alternatives (Policy Alternative 22 has a score 
of 2.3 whilst unmodified policy has a score of 4 (Table 10)). Then, one tries 
to weigh a difference in administrative feasibility against - for example -
a difference in producers' income. But for this, one must first know the 
amount of producers' income which is equivalent to 1 point on the score table, 
and this can be seen in Table 4. According to the chosen scale, 1 point on 
the score table for the aspects concerning producers' income, consumers' 
income, budget and EC incomes, is equal to 41 milliard guilders7. Hence, a 
7. According to the chosen scale, which ranges from 1 to 7, the greatest 
difference between the amounts of 123 (in the budget column and after a 
change of signs) and -122 (in the producers' income column) is identical to 
6 (Table 4, p. 31). One point of the income and budget score is equivalent 
to (123 + 122 )/6 = 41 milliard guilders of 1976. 
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difference of 1.7 is equal to 1.7 x 41 = 70 milliard guilders. If the admin-
istrative problems of Policy Alternative 22 (compared with unmodified policy) 
are considered equivalent to 21 milliard guilders producers' income, then 
one chooses 21 as the weight of administrative feasibility and 70 for produc-
ers' income (or - proportionally - 6 for administrative feasibility and 20 
for producers' income). Considering the previously mentioned weight ratios 
of 2:1.5 for producers'income and consumers' income (previously referred 
to), the weight for consumers' income becomes 15. 
By continually applying this sort of weighing system, one can achieve 
the desired comparisons between the different policy aspects. 
Weights, depending on policy effect It stands to reason that for a few pol-
icy aspects, the weight depends on the extent of the policy effect. An extra 
guilder in producers' income is usually less appreciated on a higher income 
level than on a lower income level. For the policy aspects: 
administrative feasibility 
price stability 
producers' income 
budget 
The computer programme presents the possibility of making the weight depen-
dent on the level of the policy effect. If a unit of producers' income - at 
an income level comparable to unmodified policy - is given the weight of 
20, it is then possible to give other weights to other income levels. 
Let us presume that a weight of 25 is specified for a 20 % lower income level. 
This means that 1 extra guilder producers' income (at that income level) 
weighs about 1.7 times as much as 1 extra guilder for the consumers. 
By attaching extremely heavy weights to certain areas of a policy object-
ive, one can make sure that such areas become a part of the policy alterna-
tives which receive higher priority. 
As far as other objectives are concerned, it is not likely that the weight 
depends so strongly on the policy effect. The consumers' income is a clear 
example of this. Policy changes in the dairy sector only have a slight effect 
on the level of the consumers' income. Thus, the weight of an extra guilder 
in favour of the consumer does not depend on the policy effect. 
6.3 DETERMINING THE PRIORITIES 
Once the weights have been established, the determination of priorities 
is only a matter of calculation: the formula shown in Section 6.2 is comple-
ted for each policy alternative. These priorities are shown on a certain 
scale, from which the ranking order is easily calculated. Table 11 shows the 
result of such a calculation for a specific objective. Only the Policy Alter-
natives 1, 6, 22 and 26 have been included in order to make it as clear as 
possible. 
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Table 11. Weights, score t ab le and a survey of ca lcula ted p r i o r i t i e s for some pol icy 
a l t e r n a t i v e s (European Community; period 1980 - 1994). 
W E I G H T S IN GIVEN VALUES (=ABS.) AND IN PERCENTAGES (=PERC.) 
ASPECT A B C D E F G H I J K 
ABS. 6.00 3.00 5.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 7-00 20.00 15.00 25.00 10.00 
PERC. 6.0 3-0 5.0 2.0 3.0 4-0 7.0 20.0 15.0 25.0 10.0 
+++++++++++H f+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ -+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
ROW 2 
ROW 3 
ROW 4 
A D D 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
I T I 0 N A 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
L W E I 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
3 H T S 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
IN 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
PERCENTAGES 
0.0 15.0 
0.0 22.0 
0.0 25.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
20.0 
15.0 
12.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
+++++ ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
ASPECT A 
ALTERNATIVE 
1 
6 
22 
26 
Priori 
4.0 
4.0 
2.3 
1.3 
ties 
I PRIORITIES BASED 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I PRIORITY 
I 
I 10 
I 14 
I 17 
I 24 
ALTERN. 
NUMBER 
26 
6 
22 
1 
B C 
4.0 4.0 
5.4 4.8 
4.4 4.9 
6.8 5.6 
D 
4.0 
5.4 
2.6 
4.9 
ON GENERAL INFORMATION 
SCALED PREFERENCES 
ABSOLUTE 
SCALE 
95.1 
74.8 
63.3 
0.0 
E 
4.0 
5.5 
5.2 
6.0 
I 
I 
I 
I 
100 PERCENT I 
AD-HOC SCALE I 
51.8 
40.8 
34.5 
0.0 
- - I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
F 
4.0 
3.5 
2.6 
2.8 
G H 
4.0 3.99 
3.6 2.79 
3.1 3-99 
2.2 3.47 
I 
3.99 
4.84 
3.99 
4.33 
J 
3.99 
5.06 
5.25 
5.87 
K 
3.99 
4.70 
5.25 
5.46 
SCORESUM 
ABS 
492-34 
516.50 
512.79 
523-03 
RANK 
24 
14 
17 
10 
In Table 11, the different policy aspects are represented by a letter 
rather than a name, thus A = administrative feasibility, B = income distri-
bution, etc. Firstly, the weights are converted into percentages, which is 
also the case with the supplementary weights for producers' income and bud-
get. Table 11 gives an order of priority, as well as an absolute score. Of 
the 26 policy alternatives, only 4 have been included; nevertheless, the 
ranking order for all measures has been calculated. Among the four alterna-
tives. Policy Alternative 26 has the highest priority. 
Simultaneously, Table 11 shows a summarised outline of the calculated order 
of priority, together with the results on two different scales (units). In 
the right-hand column of this outline, an 'ad hoc' scale has been used. Thus, 
unmodified policy has been placed at zero, whilst the difference between 
the most attractive and the least attractive alternative is equal to 100. 
The other policy alternatives, in proportion to the score, are divided over 
this entire area. 
Although, first of all, such a scale appears to include attractive quali-
ties, nonetheless there are a few disadvantages. 
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One can compare it with the house evaluation, it is as if the house 
appraiser each day fixes the value of a certain house (e.g. his own house) 
at zero, whilst the difference between the highest and lowest values house 
is equal to 100. In this way, it is extremely difficult to compare the 
value of houses which have been valued on different days. 
Absolute scale The absolute scale, as well as the ad hoc scale, shows un-
modified policy as a zero. Moreover, the difference between Policy Alterna-
tive 18 and unmodified policy (over the 11-year period 1980-1990 and for 
the entire EC) is equal to 100. The objectives used in the calculation (with-
out additional weights), can be seen in Table 11. 
Policy Alternative 18 can further be described as: 
a policy with once-only price decrease of 17.5 % and income allowances 
which overcompensate the producers' income decrease 
income allowances which are partly taken directly from the budget and 
partly from a milk levy (which means that consumers pay the same price as 
that of unmodified policy) 
allowances are divided according to the size of the basic yearly milk 
production, and are non-expirable 
stock policy for price stabilisation. 
The choice of this scale includes the following implications: 
The difference in priority usually lessens as a shorter period is brought 
into consideration. 
As the area in which the priorities have been calculated becomes smaller 
(e.g. the Netherlands compared with the EC), the differences in priority 
are usually reduced as well. 
Of course, the sequence and the final amounts obtained depend on the 
weights given to the different policy aspects. 
Back to the house evaluation: An absolute scale means that the apprais-
er uses the same measurement standard every day, whether he evaluates a 
house, a group of houses or a garden shed. When it concerns a rent apprais-
al, the amount increases as the leasing period increases (the latter is 
comparable to the period over which policy alternatives in the dairy sec-
tor are calculated). 
An absolute scale, as defined above, shows its worth when used frequently; 
one only gets a grip on the amounts after a certain time. 
Once the different policy effects have been brought under one denominator, 
it is possible (taking one or more objectives into consideration) to decide 
whether: 
a certain policy is favourable for the EC, as well as the Netherlands 
which instrument adjustment is necessary within a policy alternative 
how the policy effects will be valued in the course of time. 
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Report marks In addition to evaluating the objectives by applying certain 
'weights1, the policy alternatives can also be given a certain report mark. 
In this way, one attaches a value to the anticipated policy effects. If one 
applies this to a number of alternatives, it is even possible to obtain in-
sight into the implicit comparison that has been used. Moreover, such marks 
are useful in order to check the conformity between weights and certain pol-
icy type preferences. The calculated policy effects must then be considered 
as the basic starting-point. 
Indicating the value of a house by using report marks is quite under-
standable. Here also the person applying the marks should ask himself 
with which intention this is done. If a person evaluates a number of 
houses with a certain intention in mind, then one can conclude certain 
weights attached to the different qualities of a house. Consequently, 
with the same weithts, one should be able to give a report mark for other 
houses. 
In this way, intensive cooperation can be built up between the researcher 
and policy planner or decision maker (Figure 20). 
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Summary 
The construction of the computer models for the dairy sectors of both 
the European Community (EC) and the Netherlands is a continuation of the 
research carried out on behalf of the Interim Report EEC Dairy Policy (In-
terim-rapport, 1978). 
First, the possibilities concerning policy and the consequences attached, 
are analysed at EC level. This means that attention is not only given to 
production, consumption, income and budget, but also to a number of other 
policy aspects: namely, administrative feasibility, distribution of income, 
international trade equilibrium, regional specialisation, nature and environ-
ment and price stability. Once the policy effects at EC level are determined, 
then a start can be made on determining the consequences for the Netherlands. 
Decision-making concerning the EC agricultural policy is an extremely 
tiresome process. Moreover, the European Commission supplies only very lim-
ited information concerning the anticipated policy effects. In any case im-
portant policy changes can only be realised when political limitations be-
come clearly visible (e.g. the budget limit). 
The intention of this research is to supply those involved with dairy 
policy with extensive insight into the data used and the results that are 
obtainable. Moreover, it is possible to introduce one's own data and policy 
instruments in order to ascertain the consequences. An extensive sensitivity 
analysis is included. This is particularly necessary because the model con-
tains a large amount of rather uncertain information. 
In Chapter 3, the basic elements of the EC dairy model are discussed. 
Milk demand and supply curves occupy a central position. When it is possible 
to determine these curves, then the quantification of a great deal of objec-
tive variables can be based upon them. Furthermore, it appears that almost 
all the policy alternatives in the dairy sector can be transposed into conse-
quences relating to the demand and/or supply curves. 
Also in Chapter 3, the actual definition of the so-called 'dairy surplus' 
is considered. The dairy surplus is split into overproduction and undercon-
sumption in exactly the same way as in the Interim-rapport (1978) (i.e. res-
pectively higher production or lower consumption than that corresponding to 
the equilibrium price level). Consequently, there is an explanatory section 
on how the policy effects on producers' income, consumers' income, budget 
and EC income are determined for a few of the most important types of policy 
changes. The remaining policy aspects are each appropriately dealt with in 
order to assess the quantitative effects. Particularly in this part of the 
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model, there are many uncertain elements. However, all these policy objec-
tives are most consciously included in the research, with the hope that in 
doing so the analysis of dairy policy will be broadened. 
The EC dairy model is limited mainly to dairy farming and the dairy indus-
try (to the processing level of butter and skimmed milk powder). As a result, 
the consequences of policy changes concerning other agricultural products, 
have not been considered. No difference has been made between the dairy farm-
ers, as primary producers, and the dairy industry. 
Results of calculations using the EC dairy model, are presented in Chap-
ter 4. The available information is introduced very gradually, using only a 
few types of policy. Consequently, in Section 4.2, a description is presen-
ted of all 26 policy alternatives. However, due to the present form of the 
model, it is hardly possible to speak of 26 policy alternatives: variations 
in further formulation, lead to an extensive range of possibilities. Table 4 
(p. 31) shows a clear summary of the calculated results. 
The principles of the Dutch dairy sector model are identical to those of 
the EC model. 
For the Netherlands, use is made of results which have first been deter-
mined at EC level. In this way one avoids the type of study which either 
assumes that the rest of the EC is non-existent, or that a certain country 
and the entire EC are considered to be identical. 
Chapter 5 shows that effects on certain objectives (international trade 
equilibrium, regional specialisation, price stability and nature and environ-
ment with extensive land use) are the same for the Netherlands as they are 
for the EC as a whole. This is not the case with the other policy objectives. 
The definition of overproduction and underconsumption stems unequivocally 
from the definitions which have been introduced for the EC. For the Nether-
lands, besides the other objectives, attention has also been given to employ-
ment in the dairy sector. Almost all the policy alternatives have some influ-
ence on the volume of employment - especially on a long-term basis. National 
shares in the EC dairy budget, and in quotas and such like, appear to be of 
crucial importance to the Netherlands. A few examples relating to this are 
considered. In conclusion, Table 9 (p. 40) is the aspect matrix for the Neth-
erlands. 
In Chapter 6 the different policies are compared; an attempt is made to 
reduce the enormous amount of information in a sensible manner. In Table 10 
and 11 score tables are derived from the aspect matrices and using weights 
attributed to the policy objectives, a score can be calculated. The score 
is indicative of the importance attached to a certain type of policy, consid-
ering the weights of the objectives. These sorts of results make it possible: 
to ascertain which changes in the formulation of policy alternatives merit 
further attention 
to decide which information is important to well-founded decision-making. 
At this point, cooperation between research and policy preparation starts 
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taking shape. 
It appears that these types of problems are easily comparable to the valu-
ing of a house - an example which is often referred to in the explanation. 
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Samenvatting 
De constructie van computermodellen voor de zuivelsector van de Europese 
Gemeenschap (EG) en Nederland vormt een voortzetting van het onderzoek, ver-
richt ten behoeve van het Interim-rapport EEG-Zuivelbeleid (1978). Beleids-
mogelijkneden en de bijbehorende gevolgen worden in eerste instantie op EG-
niveau geanalyseerd. Hierbij wordt niet alleen gelet op produktie, verbruik, 
inkomen en budget, maar ook op een aantal andere beleidsaspecten: administra-
tieve uitvoerbaarheid, inkomensverdeling, evenwichtige internationale handel, 
regionale specialisatie, natuur en milieu en prijsstabiliteit. Zijn beleidsef-
fecten op EG-niveau eenmaal vastgesteld dan kunnen vervolgens de consequenties 
voor Nederland worden bepaald. 
De besluitvorming voor het landbouwbeleid in de EG is een uiterst moeizaam 
proces. Daarbij verschaft de Europese Commissie slechts geringe informatie 
over de te verwachten beleidseffecten. Belangrijke beleidswijzigingen zijn 
dan ook alleen te realiseren wanneer zich duidelijke politieke grenzen open-
baren (bijv. de budgetlimiet). 
In dit onderzoek is gekozen voor een opzet waarbij degenen die bij het 
zuivelbeleid betrokken zijn, uitgebreid inzicht wordt verschaft in de ge-
bruikte gegevens en in de resultaten die daarmee worden verkregen. Bovendien 
kan men zelf veranderingen in gegevens en beleidsinstrumenten invoeren, om 
vervolgens na te gaan welke consequenties dit heeft. Een uitgebreide gevoe-
ligheidsanalyse is opgenomen. Dit is vooral nodig omdat het model een behoor-
lijke hoeveelheid vrij onzekere informatie bevat. 
In hoofdstuk 3 worden de basiselementen van het zuivelmodel voor de -EG 
besproken. Een centrale plaats is ingeruimd voor de vraag- en aanbodcurven 
van melk. Wanneer het mogelijk is om deze curven te bepalen, kan de kwanti-
ficering van veel doelstellingsvariabelen hierop gebaseerd worden. Het blijkt 
vervolgens mogelijk te zijn om vrijwel alle beleidsalternatieven in de zui-
velsector te vertalen in consequenties voor de vraag- en/of aanbodcurven. 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt ook ingegaan op de definiëring en bepaling van het 
'zuiveloverschot'. Precies als in Interim-rapport (1978) wordt het 'zuivel-
overschot' gesplitst in overproduktie en onderconsumptie (= hetgeen men res-
pectievelijk meer produceert en minder consumeert dan bij een evenwichts-
prijsniveau). Vervolgens wordt toegelicht hoe de beleidseffecten op produ-
centeninkomen, consumenteninkomen, budget en EG-inkomen bij enkele van de 
belangrijkste typen beleidsveranderingen worden bepaald. De overige beleids-
aspecten krijgen elk een passende behandeling om kwantitatieve effecten vast 
te stellen. Vooral in dit onderdeel van het model zitten veel onzekere ele-
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menten. Al deze beleidsdoelstellingen zijn zeer bewust in het onderzoek mee-
genomen, om langs deze weg de analyse van het zuivelbeleid te verbreden. 
Het EG-zuivelmodel beperkt zich in hoofdzaak tot de melkveehouderij en 
de zuivelindustrie (tot het bewerkingsniveau van boter en magere melkpoeder). 
Hierdoor blijven de consequenties van beleidsveranderingen voor andere land-
bouwprodukten buiten beschouwing. Er wordt geen onderscheid gemaakt tussen 
de melkveehouders, als primaire producenten, en de zuivelindustrie. 
In hoofdstuk 4 worden resultaten van berekeningen met het EG-zuivelmodel 
gepresenteerd. De beschikbare informatie wordt stapsgewijs met enkele typen 
beleid geïntroduceerd. In paragraaf 4.2 worden alle 26 beleidsalternatieven 
omschreven. Door de huidige opzet van het model kan men niet meer van 2 6 
beleidsalternatieven spreken: variaties in de nadere formulering leiden tot 
een uitgebreid scala. Tabel 4 (p. 31) geeft een samenvattend overzicht van 
de berekende resultaten. 
De principes van het Nederlands zuivelmodel zijn gelijk aan die van het 
model voor de EG. 
Bij Nederland wordt gebruik gemaakt van de resultaten die eerst op EG-
niveau zijn bepaald. Hiermee voorkomt men het type studie waarbij de rest 
van de EG niet bestaat of waarbij een land en de gehele EG identiek worden 
geacht. 
Hoofdstuk 5 toont dat effecten op bepaalde doelstellingen (evenwichtige 
internationale handel, regionale specialisatie, prijsstabiliteit en natuur 
en milieu bij extensief grondgebruik) voor Nederland gelijk zijn aan de ef-
fecten voor de EG als geheel. Voor de andere beleidsdoelstellingen geldt 
dat niet. De bepaling van overproduktie en onderconsumptie vloeit eenduidig 
voort uit de definities die voor de EG zijn geïntroduceerd. Bij Nederland 
wordt, naast de andere doelstellingen, ook aandacht gegeven aan de werkgele-
genheid in de zuivelsector. Vrijwel alle beleidsalternatieven hebben invloed 
op het werkgelegenheidsvolume, vooral op lange termijn. Nationale aandelen 
in het EG-zuivelbudget en in quota en dergelijke blijken van cruciaal belang 
voor de consequenties die Nederland ondervindt. Enkele voorbeelden op dit 
gebied worden behandeld. Tot slot wordt de aspectentabel voor Nederland 
(Tabel 9, p. 40) gepresenteerd. 
In hoofdstuk 6 worden de verschillende beleidsmogelijkheden onderling 
vergeleken. Er wordt geprobeerd de grote hoeveelheid informatie op verant-
woorde wijze te reduceren. Uit de aspectentabel wordt een scoretabel afge-
leid, waarmee vervolgens via wegingscijfers voor de beleidsdoelstellingen 
een scoresom wordt berekend. De scoresom geeft aan welk belang men aan een 
type beleid hecht, gegeven de gehanteerde gewichten voor de doelstellingen. 
Dit soort resultaten geven de mogelijkheid om: 
na te gaan welke veranderingen in de formulering van beleidsalternatieven 
nadere aandacht verdienen 
te bepalen welke informatie belangrijk is voor een goed gefundeerde be-
sluitvorming. 
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De samenwerking tussen onderzoek en beleidsvoorbereiding kan hier gestalte 
krijgen. 
Het blijkt dat deze soort problematiek heel goed vergelijkbaar is met 
bijv. de taxatie van een huis. Dit voorbeeld wordt meerdere keren naar voren 
gehaald. 
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Appendices 
APPENDIX 1. COMPUTER OUTPUT RELATING TO THE EC 
In this appendix, a short version of the computer output for a calculation 
with the EC dairy model has been included, together with the weights of ob-
jectives to which it relates. 
A part of the information used in this calculation is reproduced on page 57. 
This data can be altered quite easily and, consequently, it is possible to 
determine the effects such data adjustments will have on the final results. 
The summed aspect matrix for the period 1980-1994 can be seen on page 58. 
This aspect matrix is exactly the same as Table 4 on page 31. It is also 
possible to prepare just one aspect table for the period of one year. We 
have chosen the year 1980; this is the first year in which the effects of 
possible policy changes have been taken into consideration. Of course, in 
actual fact, such policy changes are not (anymore) possible. Although policy 
changes in 1981 or 1982 will, indeed, have other effects, nevertheless the 
ratios do not change much. 
Money amounts presented in the aspect matrixes are in (real) 1976 guilders. 
The results are also obtainable for each currency unit within the EC (including] 
the European Currency Unit: ECU). 
Page 60 contains, first of all, additional information with regard to 
instruments which affect a number of policy alternatives, although not neces-
sarily all of them. Thus - for example - the price ratio between milk fat 
and the rest of the milk components can be described as 'endogenous' for a 
number of policy alternatives. That is, the availability of these components 
determines the price ratio. 
Also export prices (the sale of cold-store butter, etc.) sometimes depend 
on the policy pursued. Furthermore, on page 60 it is explained how (income) 
allowances are financed and distributed, and which type of quota system is 
used. In addition, on pages 60, 61 and 62 additional information for each 
policy alternative is included. This corresponds with the contents of Sec-
tion 4.2. 
The score table, which belongs to the summed aspect matrix for the period 
1980-1994, is shown on page 63. Likewise, the weights can also be found on 
the same page; and from this, the score and order of rank per policy alter-
native is determined. The calculations referring to the priorities are sum-
marised once again on page 64; the 'absolute' scale is presented at this 
point (see also Section 6.3). 
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APPENDIX 2. COMPUTER OUTPUT RELATING TO THE NETHERLANDS 
This appendix includes the results of a couple of calculations with the 
Dutch dairy model. In the same way as the EC version, page 66 gives an out-
line of a part of the information used. This page also includes information 
regarding: 
the way in which policy instruments will be financed 
- budget shares and quantity shares relating to the Netherlands. 
The results affecting the Netherlands are further based on the standard 
version of the EC dairy model (see pages 57-62). 
Pages 67 and 68 include the aspect matrices for the entire period as well 
as 1980. 
Data and results for the second calculation can be found on pages 69 and 
70. The only difference with the first calculation is to be found in the 
assumed budget shares and the amount of quotas affecting the Netherlands. 
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